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Abstract—This paper describes the problems with
using both Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) (se-
curity extension to domain name system) validating Do-
main Name System (DNS) resolvers and NAT64/DNS64
transition mechanism. In this paper we also propose
a solution how to solve the problem of such combination.
The foreign (synthesized) AAAA record as well as the
broken trust chain in such records in secure way which
doesn’t breach DNSSEC.
A current widely used solution comes from RFC 7050
[1] with conjunction with RFC 6146 [2] and RFC 6147
[3]. In such case the end node will detect Domain Name
System 6-to-4 (DNS64) by asking for well-known Internet
Protocol version 4 (IPv4) only domain, if detected end
node would disable DNSSEC validation. This solves
previously mentioned problem of foreign AAAA record
and such domain would be reachable. However this also
brakes DNSSEC validation and it does not allow operator
to control over the prefix preference.
Our proposed solution supplies the end node with
secondary DNSSEC chain to validate DNS64 synthesized
records from information already presented to the node
by Neighbor Discovery or Dynamic Host Configuration
Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6), in the way that network
operator can have a control over the prefixes and DNS
resolvers used by the end node for NAT64/DNS64 tran-
sition mechanism.
Index Terms—IPv6, NAT64, DNS64, DNSSEC.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with conjunction of two technolo-
gies. One is the security extension to domain name
system – DNSSEC [4], the second is a transition
mechanism between internet protocol version 4 and
version 6 – the Network Address Translation 6-to-4
(NAT64) [2] and its integral part DNS64 [3].
The main problem of such conjunction is the DNS64
part of the transition mechanism. Due to its nature the
DNS64 synthesize Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)
– AAAA record for domain name which has got only
IPv4 – A record, is effectively pointing the communi-
cation towards the network address translation node –
the NAT64.
On the other hand the DNSSEC is preventing un-
detected manipulation to the zone which may get
manipulated by synthesized AAAA records produced
by DNS64. In other words these technologies are
effectively working against each other. Usual way to
handle this situation is to disable one of them, either
loosing ability of communication between IPv4 and
IPv6 nodes by disabling DNS64 or by loosing security
aspects of a DNS by disabling DNSSEC validation.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
When the internet protocol version 6 has been
designed, It has been decided that instead of just
expanding IP address space by extending the IP header,
entirely new protocol should be designed. This let to
inability of IPv4 only node in communication directly
with IPv6 node and vice versa. Due to this limitation,
the tunneling and translation mechanisms has been
invented.
One of the translation mechanisms is the
NAT64/DNS64, which consists of two components.
The first component is the NAT64, which stands
for Network Address Translation IPv6 to IPv4. It
basically does the same thing as the Network Address
Translation 4-to-4 (NAT44) or the Network Address
Translation (NAT) [5] in short. It extracts the IP
header and replaces it by new one. In this case the
transformation is between two different protocols.
The second part – DNS64 is responsible for pointing
the end nodes to use NAT64 gateway. If the target does
have only IPv4 (A) record in DNS, the DNS64 resolver
synthesize an IPv6 (AAAA) record which point to
network prefix used by NAT64. This effectively point
end node to NAT64 and whole communication in the
infrastructure of operator network would go through
the IPv6 protocol (due to its priority over older IPv4).
After the transition on the NAT64 L4, data would be
transported over IPv4 to target IPv4 node. Vice versa,
the data from target to end node would be transported
over IPv4 to the NAT64 box to its IPv4 address and
then the response would be translated back to IPv6 and
send to the originating end node.
Because the NAT64/DNS64 is based on the mod-
ification of DNS responses - effectively working on
the same schema as the Man in the Middle (MitM)
attack, it opens some security vulnerabilities. These
include Denial of Service (DoS), end node flooding and
MitM attacks. To overcome this problem the DNSSEC
must be used and for DNSSEC usage, the node must
know the trusted domain list. Standard does not specify
the correct way how the trusted domain list should
be determined, however it might use some of these
sources:
• End user maintained list.
• ISP maintained list.
• Autoconfiguration via Stateless Address Auto-
configuration (SLAAC) - Domain Name System
Search List (DNSSL) option
• Autoconfiguration via DHCPv6 - option 24
• Autoconfiguration via DHCPv4
III. CURRENT SOLUTION
Current solution outlined by the RFC 7050 [1],
use well-known domain “ipv4only.arpa.” which has
got only two A records 192.0.0.170 and 192.0.0.171.
However, when the end node asks the DNS64 enabled
resolver, the response would be a IPv6 AAAA record
pointing to NAT64 pool ending by hexadecimal rep-
resentation of above mentioned addresses (C000:AA
or C000:AB). By this way the end node knows, that
network uses DNS64 and should use NAT64.
This also should trigger either DNSSEC enabled end
node stub resolver or the DNSSEC enabled caching
resolver to keep the “Checking Disabled” flag set
to zero. This action informs the DNS64 resolver to
synthesize AAAA record which otherwise would be
enabled. So in such case the IPv6 only nodes would
not be able to access the IPv4 only nodes - they would
not receive the AAAA record pointing to the NAT64
box.
To overcame possible security vulnerabilities, intro-
duced by this “legal” modification of DNS records. The
RFC 7050 [1] came up with DNSSEC validation of
provided NAT64 prefix. However method proposed by
RFC 7050 [1] is quite complex in the sense of number
of needed steps and phases and it also has got a lower
manageability.
Figure 1. Detection of NAT64 prefix according to RFC 7050 [1]
First stage of NAT64/DNS64 discovery is the detec-
tion of NAT64 prefix. This is shown in the figure 1.
In this figure it can be seen, that method proposed
by current RFC does not require the node to have
any specific knowledge about its network. This is the
bright side of current approach, however the the well-
known address has to be served in the arpa domain.
The rest of this part of this process is quite straight
forward. The DNS64 box translates the well-known
address to the NAT64 prefix according to RFC 6147
[3]. The address received from the arpa domain had to
match with the standard, otherwise record received by
the node would have been ignored. By this step, the
detection of NAT64 prefixes ends. The non-validating
node can start to use received prefix for accessing
IPv4 only nodes, however the DNSSEC would not be
available and the end node could be subjected to the
race condition type of DoS attack, MitM attack or can
participate on flooding attack. To leverage DNSSEC
for protection against such attack the end node must
verify all of the received NAT64 prefixes.
Figure 2. Validation of NAT64 prefix according to RFC 7050 [1]
The DNSSEC validating node continues in the pro-
cess according to the figure 2. In the first step the
node asks for the reverse record (PTR) for every
detected prefix – well-known encoded address outside
of well-known NAT64 prefix (that can’t be validated
by DNSSEC and it is supposed to be safe). When the
node receives the PTR reply, it had to compare the
received domain name with the list of trusted domains.
This require the end node knowledge about its network
prior to successful validation. The RFC 7050 [1] does
not explicitly describe the way for the node how to
acquire such a list but it is supposed to be either set
by user/operator or by autoconfiguration (SLAAC or
DHCPv6).
If the domain in PTR record matches a domain from
the trusted list, node have to ask for an AAAA record
of every matching PTR. After that the node must
validate every response and the address in an AAAA
response must match the previously discovered ones.
If everything checks out fine, the discovery has been
successfully completed and validated prefix is marked
as trusted.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
In the contrast with the RFC 7050 [1] solution of
this problem, we propose to reverse its logic for faster
and simpler process of NAT64/DNS64 discovery. Sup-
posing that the node has got the trusted domain list and
that it would be able to get an “active” domain list by
autoconfiguration (e.g. SLAAC – DNSSL or DHCPv6
option 24). Then the node can match those lists and
start asking for proposed Service (SRV) records.
The node would have to ask first for SRV for
nat64. ipv6 in trusted and active domains as it is
shown in the figure 3. As a response, the node would
receive a list of all prefixes with their priorities and
weights. This is one of the major differences between
proposed solution and the RFC 7050 [1], which does
not provide a way for network operator to specify
Figure 3. Proposed NAT64 SRV record and NAT64 discovery
NAT64 pool priorities. The number reserved for port
number can then be optionally used for indicating pool
sizes both for IPv6 and IPv4 or set to zero. When
it is non-zero it must indicate the length of network
masks for both protocols, IPv4 appended decadically
after IPv6 (for example 09632 – meaning NAT64 IPv6
prefix has length 96 bits and it is translated to single
IPv4 address). Then the node might additionally ask
for A record of such pool, determining its public
IPv4 address (or size of dynamic pool), if needed by
application. Otherwise only AAAA record would be
needed to determine NAT64 IPv6 pool.
Figure 4. Proposed DNS64 SRV record and DNS64 discovery
In addition to the NAT64 SRV records, we also pro-
pose the DNS64 SRV record. This adds the possibility
for network operator to run DNS64 service outside of
the primary DNS infrastructure. This way the network
operator might choose to provide DNS64 service only
to this new standard capable nodes. By this way oper-
ator may effectively solve possible problems with old
DNSSEC implementations. The process of the DNS64
server detection is shown in the figure 4.
The above mentioned figure also shows optional val-
idation of DNS64 box function. However subsequent
query and DNSSEC validation of PTR records is not
necessary due to the signature of SRV record. If the
DNS64 SRV record is not present the node should fall
back to process outlined by the RFC 7050 [1].
Of course the whole proposed solution requires
the same prerequisites as the RFC 7050 [1] does.
The domain used for NAT64 prefix discovery must
be DNSSEC secured and the DNSSEC validating
node must ensure that all responses are valid. The
PTR records should still match corresponding AAAA
records, however it is not required by proposed method
so there is also no requirement concerning DNSSEC
deployment in reverse zone. Due to the absence of
PTR record queries, there is no difference between
processing network specific NAT64 prefixes and well-
known NAT64 prefix. All of them are validated by
signatures of SRV and AAAA records in the trusted
domain. Secure transmission of trusted domains and
security of routing NAT64 prefixes remains within
responsibility of network operator and it is out of scope
of proposed NAT64 prefix discovery method.
V. CONCLUSION
Our proposed method of NAT64 prefix discovery
extends the current standard in use (the RFC 7050 [1])
by adding alternative means of secure prefix discovery.
It utilizes the well-known IPv4 only record in ARPA
domain as well as the well-known IP address and
provides compatibility with above mentioned standard
as a fallback option. Node, unaware of this method,
would not be impacted by the proposed method. Net-
work not utilizing the new method would make penalty
to method aware nodes in total length of process-
ing one SRV query and corresponding NODATA and
NSEC(/NSEC3) response.
When implemented, our proposed method should be
used before the method outlined in the RFC 7050 [1].
The first query should be for NAT64 SRV record, then
the node may ask for DNS64 SRV record or continue
with AAAA query for ipv4only.arpa for current re-
solver and fallback to SRV record method only if its
current resolver does not provide DNS64 service.
Main contribution of proposed method lays in the
added possibility of network operator to provide sorted
list of NAT64 prefixes by their priority. This allows
network operator controlled load balancing, which is
not possible with current standard. The same applies
to DNS64 service record, which also provides a pos-
sibility to run DNS64 service outside of main DNS
infrastructure. This might help to overcome possi-
bly broken implementations of current standard in
DNSSEC validating nodes.
Proposed method doesn’t suggest changes to DNS
itself nor adds any new record type. As such, it does not
introduce any new vectors of attack or performance im-
pact in usual DNS operations. Only suggested changes
are made in the NAT64/DNS64 detection algorithm.
From security perspective, it even closes one security
bug, the signature of well-known prefix, however this
vector of attack is purely academical.
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